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ABSTRACT
Existing studies on differential privacy mainly consider aggregation
on data sets where each entry corresponds to a particular participant
to be protected. In many situations, a user may pose a relational
algebra query on a sensitive database, and desires differentially pri-
vate aggregation on the result of the query. However, no known
work is capable to release this kind of aggregation when the query
contains unrestricted join operations. This severely limits the ap-
plications of existing differential privacy techniques because many
data analysis tasks require unrestricted joins. One example is sub-
graph counting on a graph. Existing methods for differentially pri-
vate subgraph counting address only edge differential privacy and
are subject to very simple subgraphs. Before this work, whether
any nontrivial graph statistics can be released with reasonable ac-
curacy under node differential privacy is still an open problem.
In this paper, we propose a novel differentially private mech-
anism to release an approximation to a linear statistic of the re-
sult of some positive relational algebra calculation over a sensitive
database. Unrestricted joins are supported in our mechanism. The
error bound of the approximate answer is roughly proportional to
the empirical sensitivity of the query — a new notion that measures
the maximum possible change to the query answer when a partici-
pant withdraws its data from the sensitive database. For subgraph
counting, our mechanism provides the first solution to achieve node
differential privacy, for any kind of subgraphs.
1. INTRODUCTION
An important task in data privacy research is to develop mecha-
nisms to publish useful results mined from sensitive database, with-
out disclosing individual privacy. Most of existing techniques pro-
vide rather limited privacy protection, since they usually address
specific attack models, or rely on specific assumptions about the
prior knowledge the potential adversary may possess. In recent
years, the paradigm of differential privacy has received increasing
attention, because it can provide robust and quantitative privacy
guarantee while making no assumptions about the prior knowledge
∗A different version of this paper has been accepted by SIGMOD
2013.
of the adversary. Data publishing algorithms that achieve differen-
tial privacy should guarantee that their outputs are randomized such
that input databases differing in one participant are almost indistin-
guishable to the adversary. Therefore, participating in a database is
unlikely to cause privacy breach.
Existing studies on differential privacy are mainly based on a
simple data model, where the input database is a set of records, and
each record corresponds to a participant. The output of a differen-
tially private data publishing algorithm should have almost identi-
cal probability distributions for input data sets that differ in exactly
one record. Various kinds of queries that compute aggregations on
data sets have been considered, and much effort has been put to
linear aggregations, on which more complex queries can be built.
The success of most existing differentially private mechanisms
relies on the precondition that the maximum possible change to the
query answer resulted from the change of one participant should be
small and bounded. Such maximum possible change is called the
sensitivity of the query, which determines the minimum magnitude
of noise needed to introduce into the answer. In practice, how-
ever, many databases contain information about not only individ-
ual participants, but also relationships between them. The change
of one participant may, in the worst case, have potentially unlim-
ited impact on the database and the query answer. Queries on such
databases are too complex to be tackled by existing techniques. In
this paper, we try to relax the precondition by allowing potentially
unbounded impact that may be incurred by new participants joining
the database, and give an elegant solution.
1.1 Motivation
Subgraph counting is an important problem in data mining and
social networks, which counts the number of occurrences of a given
query subgraph in an input graph. Despite of the enormous works
on anonymization schemes for private graphs, little has been down
to provide quantitative guarantees of privacy and utility. In [12],
subgraph counting is studied under a much weaker version of dif-
ferential privacy. Their privacy guarantee protects only against a
specific class of adversaries. The error of the approximate answer
returned by their algorithm is large — the magnitude of noise grows
exponentially with the number of edges in the subgraph. In [10]
and [7], k-triangle and k-star counting are studied, and they achieve
better privacy and utility guarantee. In particular, they achieve -
differential privacy for k-star counting, and (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy, a weaker version of differential privacy, for k-triangle count-
ing. However, their work cannot be extended to other kinds of sub-
graph. It is also worthy of mentioning the work in [5], which gives
an algorithm for releasing an approximation to the degree distribu-
tion of a graph and achieves k-edge differential privacy.
A major problem of the above works is that they can only achieve
edge privacy — each edge corresponds to a participant to be pro-
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tected. But for many real-world data, such as social networks, each
individual participant contributes to the graph a node rather than
just an edge. We desire privacy protection based on nodes rather
than edges. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve node differen-
tial privacy while obtaining reasonable query accuracy, because the
maximum possible change to the query answer resulted from the
change of one node (as well as all of its incident edges) is compa-
rable to the graph size. Prior to our work, whether any nontrivial
graph statistics can be released under node differential privacy with
reasonable accuracy is still an open problem [7]. It was widely be-
lieved that algorithms achieving node differential privacy can only
return query answers that are too noisy for practical applications [8,
5]. In this paper, we try to challenge this seemingly impossible task
and give a general solution.
In reality, databases usually consist of a number of tables. A par-
ticipant may contribute tuples to several tables, and a tuple can be
contributed collectively by multiple participants. A user may want
to issue a SQL query to the database to obtain an output table, then
requests approximate statistic of the output table. Subgraph count-
ing is, in fact, a special case of this general context, because every
subgraph count can be written as a SELECT query. It will be quite
useful if this kind of task can be solved under differential privacy.
There have been at least two attempts in the literature [9, 11], which
are based on bounding the global sensitivity of the query. How-
ever, these works support only restricted kinds of join operations,
where one participant can affect only constant number of tuples in
the output table. Even the most simple subgraph counting requires
unrestricted joins where a participant can have unbounded impact
on the query answer. Obviously, existing methods are unable to
support this kind of joins.
We focuses on the case where the SQL query can be translated
into a series of positive relational algebra calculation. We aim at
releasing an approximation to a linear statistic of the output table
with reasonable accuracy under differential privacy. Our solution
covers subgraph counting. Both node and edge differential privacy
are achievable, depending on the choice of user. Node differential
privacy is stronger than edge differential privacy, but the latter can
allow better query accuracy. When nodes or edges of the graph
are associated with auxiliary information, our solution also allows
arbitrary kinds of constraints imposed on any edges or nodes of the
subgraph, which are not supported by prior works.
1.2 Contributions
To develop differentially private mechanisms that can support
unrestricted joins, we face several difficulties. First, the problem
we study allows one participant to have complex impact on the
database. The data model assumed by existing differentially private
mechanisms is too simple to suffice our need to express the com-
plex relations between the database and the participants. Hence,
new data model is needed to express how participants affect the
database content. Second, existing notions of sensitivity, including
global and local sensitivity, are no longer appropriate in our case,
because a new participant joining the database can, in the worst
case, have unlimited impact on the query answer, leading to un-
bounded sensitivity. Thus, it is impossible for us to calibrate the
noise to such sensitivities. We need a new metric to measure the
least magnitude of noise that is necessary to answer a query. Third,
existing works for complex queries often compromise privacy guar-
antee, utility guarantee or efficiency guarantee. However, such
compromise can lead to severe problem for practical use, which
limit the applications of those techniques. It is a challenging task
to develop mechanisms that can achieve all three guarantees.
Contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose a general model of sensitive databases, which
allows one participant to affect the database content in any possible
way. By formalizing the definition of neighborhood, the notion of
differential privacy on this data model is setting up such that privacy
protection is based on individual participants.
2) We propose a new notion of sensitivity, called empirical sen-
sitivity, that measures the maximum possible change to the query
answer when a participant withdraws its data from the current
database content. Empirical sensitivity is always bounded, and is
often small. It gives a better measure of the least magnitude of
noise that is necessary to answer a query.
3) We develop a general but inefficient mechanism to answer any
monotonic query on a sensitive database. This mechanism guaran-
tees -differential privacy, and the error bound is roughly propor-
tional to the global empirical sensitivity of the query.
4) We propose a specific model of sensitive databases based on
K-relation or c-table. Every tuple in aK-relation is annotated with
a positive Boolean expression that specifies its condition of pres-
ence. K-relation is closed under positive relational algebra cal-
culation. Hence it can be used to express the complex relations
between the participants and the table output by a SQL query.
5) We develop an efficient mechanism to answer any linear query
to a sensitiveK-relation. This mechanism guarantees -differential
privacy, and the error bound is roughly proportional to the univer-
sal empirical sensitivity of the query. The computation cost is in
a polynomial of the size of K-relation. Our mechanism is the first
solution to the problem of subgraph counting for any subgraphs,
which can achieve either node differential privacy or edge differen-
tial privacy, and the error bound is roughly proportional to the local
empirical sensitivity of the query.
6) We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the proposed
mechanism. Experimental results validate the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of the new mechanism.
In Fig. 1 we present a brief comparison between our mechanism
and existing mechanisms.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Privacy and Utility
In this work, we will use differential privacy [2], a state-of-the-
art paradigm for privacy preserving data publishing. A randomized
algorithm is differentially private if it yields nearly identical distri-
butions over its outcomes when running on neighboring databases.
DEFINITION 1 (DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY). A randomized
algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private if for any pair of
neighboring databases D, D′, and for any set of possible outputs
S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ (1)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A. When
δ = 0, the algorithm is -differentially private.
All algorithms presented in this paper satisfy -differential privacy.
The definition of neighboring depends on the context or appli-
cation. Usually, D and D′ are said to be neighboring if they differ
only by one participant. In this case, a differentially private algo-
rithm can protect against disclosure of any participant. In the liter-
ature, the database D is often considered as a multiset of records,
where each record corresponds to a particular participant, then D
and D′ are neighboring if |D −D′|+ |D′ −D| = 1.
2
Queries Our mechanism Existing mechanisms
Monotonic query on a sensitive database O˜(G˜Sq/) error, Exp(|P |) time None
Linear statistic of the output of a SQL query O˜(U˜Sq/) error, Poly(|P |, |R|) time
O(USq/) error and O(1) time if there are
no unrestricted joins [9, 11]
Not solvable if there are unrestricted joins be-
cause USq ≥ GSq = +∞
triangle counting ( ) O˜(L˜Sq/) error, Poly(k, |R|) time
O(LSq/ + 1/
2) error; O(|V | · |E|) time;
only achieve differential privacy based on
edges [10]
k-star counting (e.g., 3-star )
O˜(L˜Sq/) error, Poly(k, |R|) time or
Poly(|V |, |E|, k) time
O(LSq/) error if 1/ = O(dmax/k);
O(|V | · |E|) time; only achieve differential
privacy based on edges [7]
k-triangle counting (e.g., 3-triangle )
O˜(L˜Sq/) error, Poly(k, |R|) time or
Poly(|V |, |E|, k) time
O(LSq/) error if ln(1/δ)/ = O(amax);
O(|V | · |E|) time; only achieve (, δ)-
differential privacy based on edges [7]
k-node l-edge connected subgraph counting O˜(L˜Sq/) error, Poly(k, l, |R|) time
Θ((kl2 log |V |)l−1/) error; O(1) time;
only achieve adversary privacy based on
edges w.r.t. a specific class of adver-
saries [12]
Figure 1: Comparison between our mechanism and existing mechanisms. O˜ means that logarithmic factors are omitted. For
sensitive database, |P | denotes the number of participants and | supp(R)| denotes the number of tuples returned by the SQL query.
For subgraph counting, |V | and |E| denote the number of nodes and edges in the graph, and |R| = | supp(R)| denotes the true query
answer. dmax denotes the maximum degree of a node, and amax denotes the maximum number of common neighbors of a pair of
nodes. GS, LS, US, G˜S, L˜S and U˜S are explained in Sec. 2 and Sec. 3. We have L˜Sq ≤ LSq and U˜Sq ≤ USq . Note that we do
not take account of the time needed for generating the output table or the list of matched subgraphs in the computation cost. For
subgraph counting our solution can achieve differential privacy based on either nodes or edges, depending on the choice of user.
We are interested in queries that are real-valued functions of the
database (though other kinds of queries are also important). A dif-
ferentially private algorithm must introduce randomness to its out-
put, and the answer is never exact. The utility of the algorithm is
measured by how accurate its answer is.
DEFINITION 2 ((, δ)-ACCURATE). For a database D, a
query q and the true answer q(D), we say that the answer returned
by an algorithm A is (, δ)-accurate if
Pr[|A(D)− q(D)| > ] ≤ δ (2)
2.2 Global Sensitivity
A well known approach to achieve differential privacy is Laplace
mechanism [2], which introduces i.i.d. noises into the query an-
swers. The magnitude of noise is calibrated to the sensitivity of
the query — a property of the query that measures the maximum
possible change to the true answer caused by a small change in the
database.
DEFINITION 3 (GLOBAL SENSITIVITY). For a real-valued
function q : D→ Rm, the (global) sensitivity of q is
GSq = max
D,D′∈D
‖q(D)− q(D′)‖1 (3)
where the maximum is taken over all pairs of neighboring
databases D, D′.
Given a database D ∈ D, a query sequence q : D → Rm
and a parameter  > 0, Laplace mechanism A returns A(D) =
q(D) + (Y1, . . . , Ym), where Yi are i.i.d. random variables that
follow Laplace distribution Lap(GSq/), which has the following
probability density function
Lap(y|b) = 1
2b
exp(−|y|
b
) (4)
Laplace mechanism satisfies -differential privacy. It is easy to
verify that Laplace mechanism returns (cGSq/, e−c)-accurate an-
swer to each query in the sequence q, for any c > 0.
2.3 Local Sensitivity and Smooth Sensitivity
In Laplace mechanism, the magnitude of noise depends on GSq
and the parameter , but not on the database D. Since the global
sensitivity GSq measures the impact of a participant on the true
answer in the worst case, this often introduces unnecessarily large
noise. In [10], a local measure of sensitivity was proposed
DEFINITION 4 (LOCAL SENSITIVITY). For a real-valued
function q : D → Rm and a database D ∈ D, the local sensitivity
of q at D is
LSq(D) = max
D′
‖q(D)− q(D′)‖1 (5)
where the maximum is taken over the neighborhood of D.
Observing that GSq = maxD LSq(D), we know that LSq(D)
never exceeds GSq . Ideally, we would like to release q(D) with
noise magnitude proportional to LSq(D), but the noise magnitude
might leak information and differential privacy is not satisfied. [10]
proposed that the noise magnitude should be calibrated to a smooth
upper bound S on the local sensitivity, namely, a function S that is
an upper bound on LSf at all point and such that ln(S(·)) has low
global sensitivity. [10] presents algorithms to compute the optimal
S, called the smooth sensitivity of q, for a variety of queries.
3
2.4 K-Relation and c-Table
Our work addresses aggregation on relations where each tuple
could be contributed by multiple participants, and each participant
could contribute multiple tuples. To track which participants con-
tribute a tuple and how they contribute, we use K-relation [4] or
c-table [6], a model proposed in the field of uncertain databases,
where tuples are annotated (tagged) with their provenance informa-
tion, and positive relational algebra is generalized to such tagged-
tuple relations. Here we briefly review K-relation and c-table.
Let U be a finite set of attributes and C a domain of values, then
each tuple is a function t : U → C. The set of all such U -tuples is
denoted by U -Tup. Relations without annotations are just subsets
of U -Tup. Tuples in a K-relation are annotated with elements
from a semiring (K,+, ·, 0, 1). A K-relation over U is a function
R : U -Tup → K with a finite support supp(R) = {t|R(t) 6=
0}. The operations of positive algebra on K-relation are defined as
follows [4]:
empty relation For any set of attributes U , there is ∅ : U -Tup→
K such that ∅(t) = 0 for all t.
union For R1, R2 : U -Tup → K, R1 ∪ R2 : U -Tup → K is
defined by
(R1 ∪R2)(t) = R1(t) +R2(t)
projection For R : U -Tup→ K and V ⊆ U , piVR : V -Tup→
K is defined by
(piVR)(t) =
∑
t = t′ on V andR(t′) 6= 0
R(t′)
selection For R : U -Tup → K and a selection predicate P :
U -Tup→ {0, 1}, σPR : U -Tup→ K is defined by
(σPR)(t) = R(t) · P (t)
natural join For Ri : Ui -Tup → K, i = 1, 2, R1 ./ R2 :
(U1 ∪ U2) -Tup→ K is defined by
(R1 ./ R2)(t) = R1(t1) ·R2(t2)
where t1 = t on U1 and t2 = t on U2.
renaming For R : U -Tup → K and a bijection β : U → U ′,
ρβR : U
′ -Tup→ K is defined by
(ρβR)(t) = R(t ◦ β)
Intersection and cartesian product are just special cases of natural
join. But difference is not supported in positive relational algebra.
We study differentially private aggregation on a c-table, which is
a special case ofK-relation whereK makes up of positive Boolean
expressions over some set B of variables. The term positive means
that the expressions do not involve negation (¬), but only disjunc-
tion (∨), conjunction (∧) and constants True and False. In our
work, each variable in B may correspond to a (potential) partici-
pant being protected, then the Boolean expression annotated with a
tuple t gives the condition of t being presented in the relation when
some participants may opt out.
In c-table or K-relation, expressions that yield the same truth-
value for all valuation of variables in B are considered equiv-
alent. But this is not applicable to our work. An expression
(b1∨ b2)∧ (b1∨ b3) cannot be simply rewritten into b1∨ (b2∧ b3).
Such rewriting could make our mechanism fail to satisfy differen-
tial privacy. We will review this issue later.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 Sensitive Databases and Monotonic
Queries
In the literature of differential privacy, a sensitive database is
typically considered as a multiset of records, and the privacy is de-
fined by the indistinguishability between data sets that differ by
only one record. But this definition of privacy is no longer appro-
priate in our case, where each participant could have complex effect
on the database. To achieve differential privacy in our setting, we
need to know about not only the content of the database, but also
how it changes if some participants withdraw their data. A sen-
sitive database being released should contain such self-descriptive
information. We propose a new definition of sensitive database, as
below, which is more general.
DEFINITION 5 (SENSITIVE DATABASE). A sensitive
database is an ordered pair (P,M), where P is finite set
of participants contributing the data, and M is a function
M : P(P )→ D such that M(P ′) is the content of the database if
only participants in P ′ contribute their data.
Once sensitive databases are formalized, we are ready to adapt
the notion of differential privacy to them by making clear what sen-
sitive databases are considered neighboring with each other. We say
that two sensitive databases are neighboring if one database can be
obtained from the other by one participant withdrawing its data.
DEFINITION 6 (NEIGHBORING). Two sensitive databases
(P1,M1) and (P2,M2) are neighboring if |P1−P2|+|P2−P1| =
1 and M1(P ′) = M2(P ′) for all P ′ ⊆ P1 ∩ P2.
DEFINITION 7 (ANCESTOR). We say that (P1,M1) is an an-
cestor of (P2,M2), denoted by (P1,M1)  (P2,M2), if P1 ⊆ P2
and M1(P ′) = M2(P ′) for all P ′ ⊆ P1.
We postulate a class Ω of sensitive databases, such that every
possible sensitive database being considered is an element of Ω.
Moreover, if (P,M) ∈ Ω, then all ancestors of (P,M) are also
elements of Ω. We make a further assumption that there is a spe-
cial element D0 in D such that M(∅) = D0 for all (P,M) ∈ Ω
(otherwise, Ω comprises disconnected parts).
For a sensitive database (P,M), a query q takes as input M(P ),
the current content of the database, and outputs q(M(P )). In this
paper, we address queries that output a real number and are mono-
tonic.
DEFINITION 8 (MONOTONIC QUERY). For a class Ω of sen-
sitive databases, a query q : D→ R is monotonic if both of follow-
ing hold:
• q(D0) = 0
• q(M1(P1)) ≤ q(M2(P2)) for all (P1,M1)  (P2,M2)
If the global sensitivity of a query is low, then Laplace mech-
anism can still be applied to obtaining differentially private an-
swer with reasonable accuracy. In many applications, however,
the change of a participant could, in the worst case, incur exces-
sive or even unlimited impact on the database content as well as
the query answer. No existing differentially private techniques can
process queries with unbounded global/local sensitivity. Hence,
global/local sensitivity is no longer an appropriate quantity to mea-
sure the necessary amount of noise introduced into the query an-
swer. We propose a new notion of sensitivity, empirical sensitivity,
which suffices our need.
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DEFINITION 9 (LOCAL EMPIRICAL SENSITIVITY). For
a real-valued function q : D → Rm and a sensitive database
(P,M), the local empirical sensitivity of q at (P,M) is
L˜Sq(P,M) = max
p∈P
‖q(M(P ))− q(M(P − {p}))‖1 (6)
If P = ∅, then L˜Sq(P,M) = 0.
DEFINITION 10 (GLOBAL EMPIRICAL SENSITIVITY). For
a real-valued function q : D → Rm and a sensitive database
(P,M), the global empirical sensitivity of q at (P,M) is
G˜Sq(P,M) = max
(P ′,M′)(P,M)
L˜Sq(P
′,M ′) (7)
Empirical sensitivity measures the maximum possible change
to the query answer when a participant opts out. It is obvious
that L˜Sq(P,M) ≤ LSq(M(P )) ≤ GSq and L˜Sq(P,M) ≤
G˜Sq(P,M) ≤ GSq .
3.2 Linear Queries on Sensitive Relations
Although the model of sensitive databases and monotonic
queries is general, it may be too general to allow efficient mech-
anism for obtaining differentially private answer. We are in partic-
ular interested in a special class of monotonic queries that compute
linear aggregation on a relation, and the relation is itself a function
of the sensitive database.
DEFINITION 11. A linear query q on sensitive database is a
function q = q+ ◦ q∗, where q∗ : D → P(U -Tup) and q+ :
P(U -Tup) → R, such that q∗ transforms a database D ∈ D into
a finite set of tuples (e.g. by some relational algebra calculation),
and q+ is a linear function: q+(T ) =
∑
t∈T q+(t).
Note that the output of q∗ must be finite, although the space
U -Tup can be infinite.
To ensure that a linear query q is monotonic, we pose some lim-
itations on the functions q∗ and q+. First, we require that intro-
ducing a new participant into a sensitive database never results in
removal of any tuple from the relation output by q∗. Second, we
assume that q+ is nonnegative.
DEFINITION 12. A linear query q = q+ ◦ q∗ on sensitive
database is monotonic if the following hold:
• q∗(M1(P1)) ⊆ q∗(M2(P2)) for all (P1,M1)  (P2,M2)
• q+(T ) ≥ 0 for all finite T ⊆ U -Tup
If we want to answer a linear function q+ that may yield neg-
ative output, we can decompose it into two nonnegative compo-
nents and compute them individually: q+(t) = max(0, q+(t)) −
max(0,−q+(t)).
Because we focus on a single query, where q∗ is fixed, we can
construct a class of virtual sensitive databases Ω′ = {(P,M ′)},
such that each (P,M) in Ω is mapped into a virtual one (P,M ′)
where M ′ = q∗ ◦M . Then M ′(P ) is a set of tuples and the query
q = q+ ◦ q∗ is just a linear function that computes q+(M ′(P )).
The monotonicity of q∗ transmits to the monotonicity of M ′. We
call such (P,M ′) a sensitive relation.
DEFINITION 13. A sensitive relation (P,M) is a sensitive
database with M : P(P ) → P(U -Tup), and M(P ) must be
finite. A class Ω of sensitive relations is monotonic if M1(P1) ⊆
M2(P2) for all (P1,M1)  (P2,M2) in Ω.
In this subsection and most parts of this paper, we study nonneg-
ative linear queries for a monotonic class of sensitive relations.
To obtain a differentially private answer to a query q on a relation
T = M(P ), it should specify how the relation T is affected by its
contributors P . In particular, we want to know for each tuple in T
the condition of its presence if some participants may opt out. The
definition of the function M is too general to be efficiently han-
dled in practice. Therefore, we propose to represent M as a c-table
or K-relation R, where each tuple t is annotated with a positive
Boolean expression R(t) that specifies its condition of presence.
Each variable p in an expression indicates whether the participant
p ∈ P would contribute its data. A sensitive relation represented
as a K-relation is called a sensitive K-relation, denoted by (P,R).
For a query q, an algorithm may first transform the original sensi-
tive database (P,M) into a sensitiveK-relation (P,R) in a flexible
way. For the correctness of the differentially private mechanism,
however, the transformation should guarantee that for any neigh-
boring sensitive databases the corresponding sensitive K-relations
are also neighboring. The concept of neighboring for sensitive K-
relations is defined by as follows.
DEFINITION 14. Given an equivalence relation ∼ on K, two
sensitive K-relations (P1, R1) and (P2, R2), where P2 = P1 ∪
{p}, p /∈ P1, are neighboring if R1(t) ∼ R2(t)|p→False for all t ∈
U -Tup, where R2(t)|p→False denotes an operation that replaces
all occurrences of the variable p in R2(t) with constant False.
An issue in the above definition is that it does not specify what
kinds of Boolean expressions in K are equivalent. A necessary
condition for two expressions being equivalent is that they must
yield the same truth-value for all valuation of variables. The way
we write the expressions may, or may not matter, depending on
the particular algorithms being used. For example, the inefficient
mechanism presented in Sec. 4.2 is independent of the form of ex-
pressions, so expressions that yield the same truth table are equiva-
lent. On the other hand, the efficient mechanism presented in Sec. 5
relies on the way we write an expression. We will discuss this in
Sec. 5.
In Fig. 2 we present simple examples of K-relations that are
produced by different queries to a graph. Fig. 2(a) is a subgraph
counting, while Fig. 2(b) is a more complicated query.
Finally, we introduce a variant of empirical sensitivity, which is
relevant to the error bound of our mechanism.
DEFINITION 15 (IMPACT). For a sensitive K-relation
(P,R) and a participant p ∈ P , the impact of p at R is
impact(p,R) = {t : R(t) 6∼ R(t)|p→False} (8)
DEFINITION 16 (UNIVERSAL EMPIRICAL SENSITIVITY).
For a sensitive K-relation (P,R), a participant p ∈ P and a
nonnegative linear query q, the universal empirical sensitivity of q
for a participant p at R is
U˜Sq(p,R) =
∑
t∈impact(p,R)
q(t) (9)
For a sensitive K-relation (P,R) and a nonnegative linear query
q, the universal empirical sensitivity of q at (P,R) is
U˜Sq(P,R) = max
p∈P
U˜Sq(p,R) (10)
When q(t) = 1 for all t, U˜Sq(p,R) measures how many tuples
in R have p appearing in their annotated expressions. The error
bound of our mechanism presented in Sec. 5 is roughly proportional
to the universal empirical sensitivity U˜Sq .
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t R(t)
abc a ∧ b ∧ c
bcd b ∧ c ∧ d
cde c ∧ d ∧ e
node differential privacy
t R(t)
abc eab ∧ eac ∧ ebc
bcd ebc ∧ ebd ∧ ecd
cde ecd ∧ ece ∧ ede
edge differential privacy
(a) How many triangles in a social network
t R(t)
ab a ∧ b ∧ c
ac a ∧ c ∧ b
bc b ∧ c ∧ (a ∨ d)
bd b ∧ d ∧ c
cd c ∧ d ∧ (b ∨ e)
ce c ∧ e ∧ d
de d ∧ e ∧ c
node differential privacy
t R(t)
ab eab ∧ eac ∧ ebc
ac eac ∧ eab ∧ ebc
bc ebc ∧ ((eab ∧ eac) ∨ (ebd ∧ ecd))
bd ebc ∧ ebd ∧ ecd
cd ecd ∧ ((ebc ∧ ebd) ∨ (ece ∧ ede))
ce ece ∧ ecd ∧ ede
de ede ∧ ecd ∧ ece
edge differential privacy
(b) How many pairs of friends that have a common friend
Figure 2: Examples of K-relations
4. THE RECURSIVE MECHANISM
FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first present the framework of a novel differ-
ential privacy mechanism, recursive mechanism, which can answer
any monotonic queries on any sensitive databases. Then, we give a
general but inefficient implementation of the mechanism.
4.1 The Basic Framework
Our mechanism is based on two special sequences,
H0(P,M) · · ·H|P |(P,M) and G0(P,M) · · ·G|P |(P,M),
as functions of the sensitive database (P,M) in Ω. We call H a
recursive sequence, which should satisfy the conditions given by
the following definition.
DEFINITION 17 (RECURSIVE SEQUENCE). A sequence,
H0(P,M) . . . H|P |(P,M), as a function on Ω, is called a
recursive sequence if the following conditions hold:
• H0(P,M) = 0 for all (P,M) ∈ Ω
• (Recursive Monotonicity) Hi(P2,M2) ≤ Hi(P1,M1) ≤
Hi+1(P2,M2) for all neighboring (P1,M1)  (P2,M2)
in Ω and 0 ≤ i ≤ |P1|
We call G a bounding sequence of H , which is also a recursive
sequence but satisfies some additional condition.
DEFINITION 18 (BOUNDING SEQUENCE). For a recursive
sequence H and g ≥ 1, a sequence, G0(P,M) . . . G|P |(P,M),
as a function on Ω, is called a g-bounding sequence of H , if the
following conditions hold:
• G is a recursive sequence
• Hj(P,M) ≤ Hi(P,M) + (|P | − i)Gk(P,M) for all
(P,M) ∈ Ω and all 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |P | and k =
|P | − b(|P | − j)/gc
If g = 1, we simply say G is a bounding sequence of H .
The framework of our mechanism consists of three steps
1. For a monotonic query q, we construct a recursive se-
quence H and a g-bounding sequence G of H such that
H|P |(P,M) = q(M(P )) for all (P,M) ∈ Ω.
2. Based on G, find a quantity ∆ such that ∆ approximates
G|P |(P,M) or the empirical sensitivity of q, and ln ∆ has
low global sensitivity, then we add multiplicative noise to ∆,
obtaining ∆̂, which satisfies differential privacy.
3. Based on H , find a quantity X such that X approximates
the true answer H|P |(P,M), and X has global sensitivity
∆̂, then we add Laplace noise to X , obtaining X̂ , which
satisfies differential privacy.
The concrete construction of H and G are omitted here. We
focus on Step 2 and 3 in this subsection. In the remainder of this
paper, we will omit the argument (P,M) when the context is clear.
For a sensitive database (P,M) and parameters β > 0 and θ >
0, we compute ∆ as following
∆ = min{eiβθ : G|P |−i ≤ eiβθ} (11)
We can observe several important properties of ∆. In the sequel,
all proofs of lemmas and theorems are moved to the appendix.
LEMMA 1. GSln ∆ ≤ β.
LEMMA 2. ∆ ≤ max{θ, eβG|P |}.
LEMMA 3. G|P |−ln( ∆
θ
)/β ≤ ∆.
Because ln ∆ has low global sensitivity, we can add Laplace
noise to ln ∆ to obtain a noisy version ∆̂ that satisfies differen-
tial privacy. For parameter 1 > 0 and µ > 0, we compute
∆̂ = eµ+Y ∆, where Y ∼ Lap(β/1). This finishes Step 2, and ∆̂
has several properties.
LEMMA 4. The release of ∆̂ satisfies 1-differential privacy.
LEMMA 5. Pr[∆̂ > eµ+c∆] ≤ 1
2
e−c1/β for any c > 0.
LEMMA 6. Pr[∆̂ < ∆] ≤ 1
2
e−µ1/β .
In Step 3, we first find a quantity X such that X approximates
H|P |(P,M) and GSX ≤ ∆̂. We compute X as
X = min{Hi + (|P | − i)∆̂ : 0 ≤ i ≤ |P |} (12)
We have several properties of X .
LEMMA 7. For any fixed ∆̂ ≥ 0, GSX ≤ ∆̂.
LEMMA 8. If ∆̂ ≥ ∆, then H|P |−g ln( ∆
θ
)/β ≤ X ≤ H|P |.
For parameter 2 > 0, our mechanism releases X̂ = X + Y ,
where Y ∼ Lap(∆̂/2). We give the privacy and utility guarantees
in the following theorem.
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THEOREM 1. For parameters 1 > 0, 2 > 0, β > 0,
θ > 0 and µ > 0, recursive mechanism, as described above,
satisfies (1 + 2)-differential privacy, and is (e2µ∆∗c/2 +
gdln( ∆∗
θ
)/βeG|P |, e−µ1/β + e−c)-accurate for any c > 0,
where ∆∗ = max{θ, eβG|P |}. If 1 = Θ(), 2 = Θ(),
β = 1/k, and θ and µ are constants, then the mechanism is
(O(k ln(G|P |)G|P |/), 2e
−kµ)-accurate as  → 0,k → ∞ and
G|P | →∞.
The error bound of recursive mechanism is roughly proportional
to G|P |. Hence, the most important thing in a concrete implemen-
tation of recursive mechanism is to find sequences H and G with
G|P | as small as possible.
4.2 A General but Inefficient Implementation
Now we present a general but inefficient implementation of the
recursive mechanism, which can answer any monotonic queries on
sensitive databases. For a monotonic query q, we construct H and
G as follows:
Hi(P,M) = min
(P ′,M′)(P,M),|P ′|=i
q(M ′(P ′)) (13)
Gi(P,M) = min
(P ′,M′)(P,M),|P ′|=i
G˜Sq(P
′,M ′) (14)
(15)
Then we can show that the above H and G are what we want.
THEOREM 2. The sequence H is a recursive sequence, and the
sequence G is a bounding sequence of H .
Because G|P |(P,M) = G˜Sq(P,M), the error bound of recur-
sive mechanism using these H and G is roughly proportional to
the global empirical sensitivity of q. The main disadvantage of this
implementation is the expensive computation cost for H and G.
5. EFFICIENT RECURSIVE MECHANISM
In this section, we present an efficient recursive mechanism,
which takes polynomial computation cost and can answer linear
queries on sensitive K-relations.
5.1 Recursive Mechanism with Relaxation
The central idea of the efficient recursive mechanism is relax-
ation, which introduces a mapping φ : K → [0, 1][0,1]P that
maps each Boolean expression in K into a [0, 1]-valued expression
φk : [0, 1]
P → [0, 1]. The detail of φ will be discussed in the next
subsection. Now, we first give some required properties of φ.
For simplifying notations, we let True = 1 and False = 0. For
f : P → [0, 1], we define |f | = ∑p f(p). By f ≤ g we mean
f(p) ≤ g(p) for all p. The mapping φ has the following properties.
Correctness For any k ∈ K and any Boolean assignment f :
P → {0, 1}, φk(f) = k(f).
Naturalness For any k ∈ K, any real assignment f : P → [0, 1]
and any p ∈ P , if f(p) = 0, then φk(f) = φk|p→False(f),
and if f(p) = 1, then φk(f) = φk|p→True(f).
Monotonicity For any k ∈ K and any real assignments f, g :
P → [0, 1], if f ≤ g, then φk(f) ≤ φk(g).
Convexity For any k ∈ K, φk is a convex function.
Truncated Linearity Defineψ(x) = min(1, x) and φ∗k(f) = 1−
φk(1 − ψ ◦ f). For any k ∈ K, f : P → [0, 1] and c ≥ 1,
φ∗k(cf) = min(1, cφ
∗
k(f))
Then, we introduce the notion of equivalence — two Boolean
expressions in K are equivalent if their relaxed functions under φ
are the same. This completes Definition 14 for neighboring sensi-
tive K-relations.
DEFINITION 19 (EQUIVALENCE). For any k1, k2 ∈ K, k1
and k2 are equivalent, denoted by k1 ∼ k2, if φk1 = φk2 .
Equivalence of two expressions implies that they yield the same
truth table. But expressions that yield the same truth table are not
necessarily equivalent. We will explain this in the next subsection.
Provided a nonnegative linear query q : U -Tup → R and map-
ping φ, we construct the recursive sequence H as
Hi(P,R) = min
f∈[0,1]P ,|f |=i
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(f) (16)
Note that the sum is finite since R has finite support.
THEOREM 3. The sequence H is a recursive sequence, and
H|P |(P,R) = q(supp(R)).
To construct the bounding sequence of H , we also require that
an auxiliary quantity Sk,p is provided for each k ∈ K and p ∈ P ,
which bounds the maximum change of φk(f) caused by a small
change to f(p). Formally, for all f, g ∈ [0, 1]P , if f ≤ g, and
f(p′) = g(p′) for all p′ ∈ P − {p}, then
φk(g)− φk(f) ≤ (g(p)− f(p))Sk,p (17)
Sk,p can be seen as the upper bound of the partial derivative of φk
w.r.t. p. We call Sk,p the φ-sensitivity of the expression k for p.
We can observe the following fact.
LEMMA 9. For any f ≤ g in [0, 1]P , and any k ∈ K,
φk(g)−φk(f) ≤
∑
p
(g(p)−f(p))Sk,p ≤ |g−f |max
p
Sk,p (18)
Assuming that all φ-sensitivities Sk,p are known, we construct a
2-bounding sequence G of H as
Gi(P,R) = 2 min
f∈[0,1]P ,|f |=i
max
p∈P
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(f)SR(t),p (19)
THEOREM 4. The sequence G is a 2-bounding sequence of H .
5.2 The Mapping φ
Here we discuss the mapping φ, the issues about annotation
of Boolean expressions, and the utility guarantee of the recursive
mechanism. For an expression k, we define φk in a recursive way,
as follows:
• φFalse(f) = 0 and φTrue(f) = 1 for all f
• φp(f) = f(p) for all p ∈ P
• φx∧y(f) = max{0, φx(f) + φy(f) − 1} and φx∨y(f) =
max{φx(f), φy(f)} for all expressions x and y
It can be shown that the above φ is just what we need.
THEOREM 5. The mapping φ, defined above, have the desired
properties of correctness, naturalness, monotonicity, convexity, and
truncated linearity.
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The output of mapping φ is invariant under certain kinds of trans-
formations of the input expressions.
Identity φx∧True = φx, φx∨False = φx
Annihilator φx∧False = φFalse, φx∨True = φTrue
Associativity φx∧(y∧z) = φ(x∧y)∧z , φx∨(y∨z) = φ(x∨y)∨z
Distributivity of ∧ over ∨ φx∧(y∨z) = φ(x∧y)∨(x∧z)
Two expressions are equivalent if one can be obtained from another
via a series of above transformations. Because φ is defined recur-
sively, the above transformations can be applied to any place of an
expression k without changing φk.
Before invoking our mechanism, one needs to first generate a
sensitive K-relation from the sensitive database and then issue a
monotonic query. To satisfy differential privacy, it is important
to ensure that for any neighboring sensitive databases the result-
ing sensitive K-relations are still neighboring, according to Def-
inition 14. Hence, when we annotate tuples with expressions that
specify their conditions of presence, we should take care of the way
we write the expressions. Specifically, if a tuple t is annotated with
expression k, then we should ensure that when any participant p
opts out, the new expression k′ annotated with t can be obtained
from k|p→False via a series of invariant transformations. If this is
guaranteed, then we say the annotation is safe. Fortunately, safe
annotation is often easy to achieve. For positive relational algebra
queries, the annotation provided in Sec. 2.4 is always safe. More-
over, two expressions in disjunctive normal form are equivalent if
and only if they produce the same truth table. Therefore, if we
always expand all expressions into disjunctive normal form, then
the annotation is always safe.
The φ-sensitivities Sk,p, which bound the partial derivative of
φk w.r.t. p, are also computed in a recursive way
• STrue,p = SFalse,p = 0 and Sp,p = 1
• Sx∧y,p = Sx,p + Sy,p and Sx∨y,p = max{Sx,p, Sy,p}
We can observe several properties of φ-sensitivities: 1) Sk,p is
not greater than the number of occurrences of p in expression k;
2) Sk,p is at most one plus the the number of occurrences of ∧
in k; 3) if k is written in disjunctive normal form (e.g., the case
of subgraph counting), then Sk,p ≤ 1; 4) for positive relational
algebra query, if each tuple in the input tables is associated with at
most one participant, and we use the approach described in Sec. 2.4
to annotate the tuples in the output table with expressions, then
Sk,p is at most one plus the number of operations in the positive
relational algebra query. In Fig. 3 we present several examples of
φ-sensitivity.
If we take the maximum S of Sk,p over all k ∈ {R(t)} and
p ∈ P , then we can find that G|P |(P,R) ≤ 2S · U˜Sq(P,R).
Hence, we conclude that the error bound of our mechanism is
roughly proportional to S times the universal empirical sensitivity
of q. In general, S is linear in the length of the positive relational
algebra query. If all expressions are converted to disjunctive nor-
mal form, then S is just a constant 1. In particular, for subgraph
counting we have U˜Sq = G˜Sq = L˜Sq . Thus the error bound is
roughly proportional to the local empirical sensitivity of q.
5.3 Computation Cost
Note that the computation for each Hi and Gi can be encoded
into a linear program with O(L) variables, where L denotes the
total length of all annotated expressions R(t) for t ∈ supp(R).
Therefore, our mechanism can run in polynomial time.
expression k φ-sensitivities of k
a ∧ b ∧ c Sk,a = Sk,b = Sk,c = 1
(a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) ∧ (b ∨ d) Sk,a = Sk,b = 2, Sk,c = Sk,d = 1
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) ∨ (b ∧ d) Sk,a = Sk,b = Sk,c = Sk,d = 1
Figure 3: Examples of φ-sensitivities
A simple algorithm that computes all Hi and Gi will need to
solveO(|P |) linear programs. We can improve this by utilizing the
monotonicity of G and the convexity of H .
LEMMA 10. (Convexity of H) Hi+1−Hi ≤ Hi+2−Hi+1 for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ |P | − 2.
Let j = arg min{ejβθ : G|P |−j ≤ ejβθ}, then ∆ = ejβθ.
We can observe that j = ln( ∆
θ
)/β ≤ 1 + ln(G|P |
θ
)/β. Hence,
∆ can be computed with access to the last O(ln(G|P |)/β) entries
of G. Furthermore, because G|P |−j − ejβθ is monotonously de-
creasing, we can use binary search to find j, with access to only
O(ln(ln(G|P |)/β)) entries of G.
Given ∆ and ∆˜, we then computeX = Hi+(|P |− i)∆̂, where
i = arg min{Hi + (|P | − i)∆̂ : 0 ≤ i ≤ |P |}. To do this, we
compute
i′ = arg mini′∈[0,|P |]Hi′ + (|P | − i′)∆̂ (20)
In the above formula, the range of i′ is a real interval rather than
an integer, and the definition of Hi′ is the same as Eq. 16. So i′
can be computed by solving a linear program. Due to the convexity
of H , we also know that bi′c ≤ i ≤ di′e. Hence, i can then be
computed with access to only two entries of H .
THEOREM 6. Efficient recursive mechanism can run in
O(ln(ln(G|P |)/β)T (L)) time, where T (L) denotes time needed
to solve a linear program with O(L) variables, and L denotes the
total length of all annotated expressions R(t) for t ∈ supp(R).
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of our
mechanism. We first compare our mechanism with existing mech-
anisms for answering subgraph counting queries, then we use our
mechanism to process more general K-relations.
For each experiment, we generate several different graphs (orK-
relations) by random, and for each graph we run every mechanism
many times to obtain a series of answers. We measure the accu-
racy of mechanisms by median relative error, that is, the median of
the ratios between the absolute errors and the true answers. This
measure of accuracy is consistent with the work [7].
6.1 Subgraph Counting
For subgraph counting, we compare the accuracy of our mecha-
nism with the following existing mechanisms:
Local sensitivity mechanisms include the triangle algorithm of
[10], the k-star algorithm and the k-triangle mechanism of [7]. All
algorithms are based on the local sensitivity of the query. The k-
triangle algorithm achieves only (, δ)-differential privacy, while
the others can achieve -differential privacy.
RHMS mechanism of [12] can process subgraph counting for any
connected subgraphs. It achieves only (, γ)-adversarial privacy for
a specific class of adversaries.
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Figure 4: Comparing accuracy of different mechanisms in various settings.
We set  = 0.5 and δ = γ = 0.1, which follows the parameter
setting of [7].1 Our mechanism can achieve -differential privacy,
which is much stronger than the corresponding (, δ)-differential
privacy and (, γ)-adversarial privacy. We test two versions of our
mechanism, one provides node privacy, and the other provides edge
privacy. Because node privacy requires that the released answer
must be insensitive to the change of one node and all of its incident
edges, it needs to introduce noise of much greater magnitude into
the answer. Note that all other mechanisms in comparison can only
provide edge privacy. For our mechanism, we simply set θ = 1,
β = /5 and µ = 0.5, and we set µ = 1 for node differential
privacy.
We first perform experiments on synthetic graphs that are gener-
ated by random. We generate graphs with various numbers of nodes
and average degree avgdeg. Each edge in the graph appears inde-
1It is widely believed by researchers that to provide useful privacy
guarantee δ should be a negligible function of database size [10, 1,
3, 13] (i.e., δ is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial:
δ = 1/|P |ω(1)). However, the k-triangle algorithm [7] yields too
noisy answers for such small δ.
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Figure 5: Running time of recursive mechanism, avgdeg = 10.
pendently with probability avgdeg /(|V | − 1). The experimental
results are presented in Fig. 4.
It can be observed that RHMS mechanism does not yield mean-
ingful answers for triangle counting and 2-triangle counting. This
is because that its error bound grows exponentially with the number
of edges in the subgraph. In some experiments, the relative errors of
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netscience power 1138 bus bcspwr10 gemat12 ca-GrQc ca-HepTh
|V | 1589 4941 1138 5300 4929 5242 9877
|E| 2742 6594 2596 13571 33111 14496 25998
total number of triangles
3764 651 128 721 592 48260 28339
running time of recursive mechanism in seconds (node privacy)
8.924 0.468 0.078 0.655 0.640 3940.552 788.160
running time of recursive mechanism in seconds (edge privacy)
19.188 0.374 0.063 0.406 0.483 54236.462 2104.818
Figure 6: Sizes of real graphs and running time of our mecha-
nism for triangle counting.
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Figure 7: Comparing accuracy of different mechanisms for tri-
angle counting on different graphs.
RHMS mechanism are extremely high and the curves do not show
in the figures. Moreover, the errors of local sensitivity mechanisms
are also too high to be useful for triangle counting and 2-triangle
counting when the graph is very sparse, because the smooth upper
bound of local sensitivity is often high (relative to the true answer)
for triangle counting on sparse graphs.
Our mechanism, when providing edge privacy (the same as other
compared mechanisms), always yield the most accurate answers.
When providing node privacy, our mechanism has high relative er-
ror for 2-star counting and 2-triangle counting, this is because the
change of one node can affect a large number of 2-stars and 2-
triangles in the graph. Nonetheless, the relative error of our mech-
anism decreases while the size of graph grows.
In Fig. 5, we present the running time of our mechanism. Be-
cause each matched subgraph found in the whole graph contributes
a tuple into the K-relation, the computation cost of our mechanism
grows polynomially with the true answer. Since the average degree
is fixed, the number of triangles and 2-triangles often decreases
when the graph enlarges, hence our mechanism runs faster for large
sparse random graphs. On the other hand, the number of 2-stars is
roughly proportional to the number of nodes, so the running time
of our mechanism grows with the graph size2.
We also evaluate the mechanisms on several real datasets3. Ex-
perimental results are shown in Fig. 6 and 7. We can see that our
mechanism are often superior to the other mechanisms. This vali-
dates the practical usage of our mechanism.
6.2 Processing K-Relations
2When the degrees of nodes are large, the number of k-stars and
k-triangles can grow exponentially with k. One may think that
our mechanism has exponential computation cost in this situation.
Actually, the algorithm can be improved by a clever construction
of K-relation, such that the size of K-relation is asymptotically
independent of k. Due to limitation of space, we cannot present the
details in this paper.
3Available at http://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/sparse/matrices/
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Figure 8: Evaluating recursive mechanism on K-relations with
various length of expressions, | supp(R)| = 1000.
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Figure 9: Evaluating recursive mechanism on K-relations of
various sizes, each expression has 3 clauses.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our mechanism for pro-
cessing more general queries. Because there are many different
kinds of positive relational algebra queries, we directly generateK-
relations that could be produced by some relational queries. In par-
ticular, we consider two kinds ofK-relations: K-relations in which
every tuple is annotated with a 3-DNF Boolean expression, andK-
relations in which every tuple is annotated with a 3-CNF Boolean
expression. A 3-DNF K-relation can be produced by a union of
many join results, and a 3-CNF K-relation can be produced by a
join of many unions of tables. We simply generate all expressions
by random, but ensure that all annotated expressions have the same
length. We also make |P |, the total number of variables, equal to
| supp(R)|, the size of the K-relation. We let q(t) = 1, that is, the
true answer is just | supp(R)|. The performance of our mechanism
is shown in Fig. 8 and 9. We do not present experimental results
for different kinds of q(t) because the curves are almost the same.
The dotted curves in the figures denote the relative error if the
absolute error exactly matches U˜Sq/, where U˜Sq is the maxi-
mum number of tuples that have at least one common participant
appearing in their annotated expressions. The error of our mecha-
nism is nearly linear in U˜Sq/, as shown in the figures. The em-
pirical sensitivity U˜Sq is insensitive to the increase of the number
of participants and the number of tuples in R. Hence the relative
error of our mechanism can gradually decrease if more data are
available. In terms of computation cost, the running time of our
mechanism grows polynomially with | supp(R)| and the length of
expressions.
7. RELATED WORK
Since differential privacy was introduced [2], it has gained con-
siderable attention, and many techniques were developed for pri-
vate data analysis. Dwork et al. [2] showed that differential privacy
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can be achieved if we calibrate the noise to the global sensitivity
of the query, and proposed the Laplace mechanism. The noise
yielded by Laplace mechanism is independent of the database in-
stance. Due to simplicity and wide applicability of Laplace mech-
anism, many succeeding work for various query tasks were built
upon Laplace mechanism. These include the relevant work [9, 11]
that studied relational algebra queries under differential privacy.
Laplace mechanism fails to provide useful answers for queries
that have large global sensitivity. Nissim et al. [10] introduced the
notion of local sensitivity, and proposed to calibrate the noise to a
smooth upper bound of the local sensitivity. This leads to the idea
of instance-dependent noise. They also gave algorithms for com-
puting smooth sensitivity of triangle count as well as some other
statistics in a variety of domains. However, there are no general
way to compute the smooth sensitivity of a given query.
Inspired by the work [10], Karwa et al. [7] studied the problem of
k-star counting and k-triangle counting, which were based on the
local sensitivity of the query. Rastogi et al. [12] addressed counting
of general subgraphs, which achieves utility better than global sen-
sitivity based mechanism by relaxing the privacy guarantee. These
approaches only provide edge privacy guarantee.
There were also extensive studies on privacy in graph data be-
yond the scope of differential privacy, but most do not provide
qualitative privacy and utility guarantee. Readers can refer to the
survey [14] for techniques that are based on k-anonymity.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a novel differentially private
mechanism for releasing an approximation to a linear statistic of a
table output by some positive relational algebra query to a database.
It turns subgraph counting as a special case, and can provide guar-
antee of either node differential privacy or edge differential privacy.
Empirical evaluation shows that our mechanism can return more
accurate answer than existing algorithms for subgraph counting,
while achieving the same or even stronger privacy guarantee.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
LEMMA 1. GSln ∆ ≤ β.
PROOF SKETCH. For all neighboring (P1,M1)  (P2,M2),
let i = arg mini{eiβθ : G|P1|−i(P1,M1) ≤ eiβθ} and j =
arg minj{ejβθ : G|P2|−j(P2,M2) ≤ ejβθ}, we show that
i ≤ j ≤ i + 1. Note that G is a recursive sequence. Because
e(i−1)βθ < G|P1|−(i−1)(P1,M1) ≤ G|P2|−(i−1)(P2,M2), we
have j ≥ i. Similarly, because e(i+1)βθ ≥ G|P1|−i(P1,M1) ≥
G|P2|−(i+1)(P2,M2), we have j ≤ i+ 1.
LEMMA 2. ∆ ≤ max{θ, eβG|P |}.
PROOF SKETCH. Suppose ∆ = eiβθ. If i = 0, then ∆ = θ,
otherwise, ∆ = eβe(i−1)βθ < eβG|P |−i ≤ eβG|P |.
LEMMA 3. G|P |−ln( ∆
θ
)/β ≤ ∆.
PROOF SKETCH. Suppose ∆ = eiβθ. Then the lemma is true
because ln( ∆
θ
)/β = i.
LEMMA 5. Pr[∆̂ > eµ+c∆] ≤ 1
2
e−c1/β for any c > 0.
PROOF SKETCH.
Pr[∆̂ > eµ+c∆] = PrY∼Lap(β/1)[Y > c] (21)
= PrY∼Lap(1)[Y > c1/β] (22)
=
1
2
e−c1/β (23)
LEMMA 6. Pr[∆̂ < ∆] ≤ 1
2
e−µ1/β .
PROOF SKETCH. The same as the previous lemma.
LEMMA 7. For any fixed ∆̂ ≥ 0, GSX ≤ ∆̂.
PROOF SKETCH. For all neighboring (P1,M1)  (P2,M2),
let i = arg miniHi(P1,M1) + (|P1| − i)∆̂ and j =
arg minj Hj(P2,M2) + (|P2| − j)∆̂. Then, we have
X(P1,M1) =Hi(P1,M1) + (|P1| − i)∆̂ (24)
≤Hj−1(P1,M1) + (|P1| − (j − 1))∆̂ (25)
≤Hj(P2,M2) + (|P2| − j)∆̂ (26)
=X(P2,M2) (27)
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X(P2,M2) =Hj(P2,M2) + (|P2| − j)∆̂ (28)
≤Hi(P2,M2) + (|P2| − i)∆̂ (29)
≤Hi(P1,M1) + (|P1| − i+ 1)∆̂ (30)
=X(P1,M1) + ∆̂ (31)
LEMMA 8. If ∆̂ ≥ ∆, then H|P |−g ln( ∆
θ
)/β ≤ X ≤ H|P |.
PROOF SKETCH. The second inequality is obvious, so we show
the first inequality. Let i = arg miniHi+(|P |− i)∆̂ and suppose
∆ = ejβθ, then
H|P |−g ln( ∆
θ
)/β =H|P |−gj (32)
(by the property of g-bounding sequence)
≤Hi + (|P | − i)G|P |−j (33)
≤Hi + (|P | − i)∆ (34)
≤Hi + (|P | − i)∆̂ (35)
=X (36)
THEOREM 1. For parameters 1 > 0, 2 > 0, β > 0,
θ > 0 and µ > 0, recursive mechanism, as described above,
satisfies (1 + 2)-differential privacy, and is (e2µ∆∗c/2 +
gdln( ∆∗
θ
)/βeG|P |, e−µ1/β + e−c)-accurate for any c > 0,
where ∆∗ = max{θ, eβG|P |}. If 1 = Θ(), 2 = Θ(),
β = 1/k, and θ and µ are constants, then the mechanism is
(O(k ln(G|P |)G|P |/), 2e
−kµ)-accurate as  → 0,k → ∞ and
G|P | →∞.
PROOF SKETCH. The privacy guarantee is obvious since both
the computation of ∆̂ and X̂ satisfy differential privacy. The utility
guarantee is also true because
1) with probability at least 1 − e−µ1/β , we have ∆ < ∆̂ <
e2µ∆;
2) with probability at least 1− e−c, we have |X̂−X| ≤ ∆̂c/2;
3) if ∆̂ ≥ ∆, we have |X −H|P || ≤ (g ln( ∆θ )/β)G|P |
THEOREM 2. The sequence H is a recursive sequence, and the
sequence G is a bounding sequence of H .
PROOF SKETCH. For any neighboring (P1,M1)  (P2,M2),
P1 ∪ {p} = P2, and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ |P1|, y ∈ {1, 2}, let
P iy = arg minP ′⊆Py,|P ′|=i q(My(P
′)). Then, because H0 = 0
and
Hi(P2,M2) = q(M2(P
i
2)) ≤ q(M2(P i1)) (37)
= q(M1(P
i
1)) (38)
= Hi(P1,M1) (39)
Hi(P1,M1) = q(M1(P
i
1)) ≤ q(M1(P i+12 − {p})) (40)
≤ q(M2(P i+12 )) (41)
= Hi+1(P2,M2) (42)
H is a recursive sequence. The same reasoning also applies to G
being a recursive sequence.
Now we show that G is a bounding sequence of H . For any
0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |P |, let A = arg minP ′⊆P,|P ′|=i q(M(P ′)), and let
B = arg minP ′⊆P,|P ′|=i G˜Sq(P
′,M). Then
Hj ≤q(M(B)) (43)
≤q(M(A ∩B)) + |B −A|G˜Sq(B,M) (44)
≤q(M(A)) + (|P | − i)G˜Sq(B,M) (45)
=Hi + (|P | − i)Gj (46)
For the following proofs, we define f ∪ g, f ∩ g : P → [0, 1] by
(f∪g)(p) = max(f(p), g(p)) and (f∩g)(p) = min(f(p), g(p)).
We also define fp : P → [0, 1] as an indicator function that has
fp(p) = 1 and fp(p′) = 0 for all p′ 6= p, and let fP ′ =
∑
p∈P ′ fp.
THEOREM 3. The sequence H is a recursive sequence, and
H|P |(P,R) = q(supp(R)).
PROOF SKETCH. H|P |(P,R) = q(supp(R)) is obvious due to
correctness of φ. We will show that H is a recursive sequence.
For any neighboring (P1, R1)  (P2, R2), P1 ∪ {p} =
P2, and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ |P1|, y ∈ {1, 2}, let f iy =
arg minf∈[0,1]Py ,|f |=i
∑
t q(t)φRy(t)(f). Then, we have H0 = 0
and
Hi(P2, R2) =
∑
t
q(t)φR2(t)(f
i
2) (47)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR2(t)(f
i
1) (48)
(naturalness of φ)
=
∑
t
q(t)φR2(t)|p→False(f
i
1) (49)
(R1(t) and R2(t)|p→False are equivalent)
=
∑
t
q(t)φR1(t)(f
i
1) (50)
=Hi(P1, R1) (51)
Due to |f i+12 ∩ (1− fp)| ≥ i and monotonicity of φ, we have
Hi(P1, R1) =
∑
t
q(t)φR1(t)(f
i
1) (52)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR1(t)(f
i+1
2 ∩ (1− fp)) (53)
=
∑
t
q(t)φR2(t)(f
i+1
2 ∩ (1− fp)) (54)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR2(t)(f
i+1
2 ) (55)
=Hi+1(P2, R2) (56)
THEOREM 4. The sequence G is a 2-bounding sequence of H .
PROOF SKETCH. The proof for G being a recursive sequence
is the same as the proof for H . Now we show that for any 0 ≤
i ≤ j ≤ |P |, we have Hj ≤ Hi + (|P | − i)Gk, where k =
|P | − b(|P | − j)/2c.
Let h = arg minh∈[0,1]P ,|h|=i
∑
t q(t)φR(t)(h),
g = arg ming∈[0,1]P ,|g|=k 2 maxp
∑
t q(t)φR(t)(g)SR(t),p,
and f(p) = max(0, 1 − 2(1 − g(p))) for all p ∈ P . We first
observe that, due to truncated linearity of φ, if φR(t)(f) > 0, then
φR(t)(g) > 0.5. Thus,
Hj ≤
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(f) (note that |f | ≥ j) (57)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(h ∩ f)+
12
|f − h ∩ f |max
p
∑
t:φR(t)(f)>0
q(t)SR(t),p (58)
(φR(t)(f) > 0⇒ φR(t)(g) > 0.5) (59)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(h ∩ f)+
|f − h ∩ f |max
p
∑
t
2q(t)φR(t)(g)SR(t),p (60)
≤
∑
t
q(t)φR(t)(h) + (|P | − i)Gk (61)
=Hi + (|P | − i)Gk (62)
THEOREM 5. The mapping φ, defined above, have the desired
properties of correctness, naturalness, monotonicity, convexity, and
truncated linearity.
PROOF SKETCH. These properties can be easily proved by in-
duction, so we omit the details.
LEMMA 10. (Convexity of H) Hi+1−Hi ≤ Hi+2−Hi+1 for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ |P | − 2.
PROOF SKETCH. First note that the function h(f) =∑
t q(t)φR(t)(f) is convex, due to the convexity of φ. Then, let
f i = arg minf∈[0,1]P ,|f |=i h(f). We have
Hi+1 = h(f
i+1) ≤h((f i + f i+2)/2) (63)
(convexity of h)
≤(h(f i) + h(f i+2))/2 (64)
=(Hi +Hi+2)/2 (65)
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